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I. Introduction. 
Any student in a basic securities regulation class knows that the 
institutionalization of U.S. markets significantly impacts the regulatory decisions made 
by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  So much attention is paid to 
institutional investors that it is easy to overlook the fact that there are still many 
individual investors who choose to invest directly in the stock markets.  And, like all 
investors, these retail investors can be the victims of false corporate disclosures.  The 
goal of this paper is assess how the private remedies available under the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws treat these defrauded retail investors.   
The obvious answer is that retail investors are not treated very well.  I say that this 
is an obvious answer because the federal securities laws have a distinctly anti-investor 
flavor to them these days.  It has become increasingly difficult for defrauded investors to 
recover in securities fraud class actions.  So, arguably, all defrauded investors – retail 
investors and institutional investors alike – are not treated very well by federal law.  
However, that answers only part of the question.  To truly see how defrauded retail 
investors are treated under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, it is 
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helpful to compare the treatment they receive to the treatment received by institutional 
investors.   
This comparison reveals that retail investors who have been defrauded by false 
corporate disclosures are particularly disadvantaged by the federal securities laws.  Such 
disfavored treatment of an important subset of investors is surprising, given that retail 
investors are commonly thought to be more in need of protection under the federal 
securities laws than institutional investors.   
Part II of this paper provides the background necessary to understanding the 
disfavored treatment received by retail investors seeking a remedy for securities fraud.  It 
begins with an overview of retail investors.  After demonstrating the significance of the 
retail investor on U.S. markets, I describe the demographic profile and behavioral 
characteristics of the typical retail investor.   Part II also provides a brief summary of the 
legal framework of investor remedies under the antifraud provisions the federal securities 
laws.  It begins with a discussion of Rule 10b-5, the general antifraud provision of the 
federal securities, and then moves on to a discussion of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 
In Part III, I identify several areas in which the federal securities laws disfavor 
retail investors who have been defrauded by false corporate disclosures.  First, I examine 
the treatment of retail investors who qualify as members of a securities fraud class action.  
I show that retail investors often lose the opportunity to manage a securities fraud class 
action to an institutional investor.  Moreover, judicial application of the “reasonable 
investor” materiality standard can negatively impact retail investors seeking damages in a 
securities fraud class action.  Second, I demonstrate that retail investors – who generally 
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engage in buy-and-hold investment strategies – often do not have any remedy for fraud 
under the federal securities laws.  And, finally, I argue that the federal securities laws 
have created a two-tiered system of investor remedies for securities fraud.  Institutional 
investors are permitted to pick and choose which law and forum offers them the most 
attractive chance for recovery, but retail investors typically do not have this opportunity.  
They are forced to sue under federal law in federal court.  I then show that the disfavored 
treatment of retail investors does not appear to be intentional; instead, retail investors 
appear to be simply overlooked. 
In Part IV, I discuss what, if anything, can be done to address the disfavored 
treatment of retail investors.   I show that disfavored treatment could lead retail investors 
to question the fairness of the federal securities laws, contributing to a loss of investor 
confidence in U.S. markets.  In addition, I analyze whether the specific areas of 
disfavored treatment of retail investors can be corrected.  I conclude by exhorting 
policymakers to recognize that the securities fraud class action significantly 
disadvantages retail investors.   Policymakers need to become much more aware of the 
plight of the defrauded retail investor when considering reforms to private securities 
fraud litigation and when determining enforcement initiatives. 
II.  Background. 
A.  The Retail Investor. 
What is a “retail investor?”  In one sense, the term “retail investor” can be used 
simply as a way to differentiate individual investors from institutional investors.  Thus, 
any individual who owns stock by any means, direct or indirect, could be defined as a 
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retail investor.1  However, I use the term “retail investor” in a more limited way to mean 
an individual who directly owns stock, as opposed to an individual who owns stock 
indirectly through a mutual fund or retirement plan.  Most retail investors, of course, also 
own stock indirectly. 
Recent information about retail investors is available through two important 
surveys:  (1) the Survey of Consumer Finances (“SCF”), conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Board,2 and (2) Equity Ownership in America, 2005, a survey prepared by the 
Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association.3  The SCF surveys 
respondents on a wide variety of financial questions, including direct and indirect 
ownership of publicly-traded stocks.   The ICI and the SIA conduct their own, more 
specific, survey, which focuses entirely on direct and indirect ownership of publicly-
traded stocks.  These surveys, together with other resources, provide intriguing insights 
into retail investors.   
The U.S. securities markets have become increasingly institutionalized over the 
years, and the number of retail investors has in turn dramatically declined.4  But reports 
of the death of the retail investor are premature.   A significant number of individuals 
continue to invest directly in the stock market.  According to the most recent Survey of 
Consumer Finances, approximately 20% of American families directly own stock in 
                                                 
1
 The New York Stock Exchange identifies four ways that individuals can own stock:  (1) direct ownership; 
(2) indirect ownership through mutual funds outside of retirement plans;  (3) indirect ownership through 
retirement plans, such as 401(k) plans; and (4) indirect ownership through defined contribution pension 
plans.  See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, SHAREOWNERSHIP2000 10 (2000). 
2
 The Federal Reserve Board conducts the SCF every three years.  The most recent survey tracks 2004 
consumer behavior; the 2007 survey is currently being conducted.   
3
 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE & SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN 
AMERICA, 2005, Figure 48 at 44 (2005).  The 2005 survey was the third such survey conducted by the 
Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association.  Previous surveys were conducted in 
2002 and 1999. 
4
 In 1950, over 90% of U.S. stocks were directly owned by individual investors.  By 2004, less than a third 
of U.S. stocks were directly owned by individual investors.   See John C. Bogle, Individual Stockholder, 
R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at A16.   
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publicly-traded companies.5  As the following table6 shows, this number does not appear 
to be declining: 
  Percentage of Households 
Year  Directly Owning Publicly-Traded Stock 
1989  19.0%7 
1992  17.8%8 
1995  15.3%9 
1998  19.2%10 
2001  21.3%11 
2004  20.7%12 
 
Moreover, it is estimated that retail investors are responsible for approximately a third of 
the trading volume on U.S. exchanges.13  Thus, despite the institutionalization of stock 
ownership in the United States, a substantial number of American investors appear to be 
committed to investing directly in the stock market.   
                                                 
5
 Brian Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell, & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  
Evidence from the 2001 and 2004  Survey of Consumer Finances, Table 5.b, at A13 (2006) (available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf).   A more recent survey prepared by the 
Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association places the percentage of families 
directly owning the stock of publicly-traded companies at an even higher number:  approximately 25%.  
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE & SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, supra note 3, at 44.  In addition, 
this study estimates that 28.4 million households – and 42.5 million individuals -- directly owned stock in 
2005.  See id.   
6
 This table was created using information from the relevant SCF.  
7
 See Arthur Kennickell & Janice Shack-Marquez, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances from the 1983 
and 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, Table 4, at 5 (Jan. 1992) (available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/89/bull0192.pdf).  
8
 See Arthur B. Kennickell & Martha Starr-McCluer, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  Evidence 
from the 1989 and 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, Table 5.B., at 869 (Oct. 1994) (available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/92/bull1094.pdf). 
9
 See Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer & Annika E. Sunden, Recent Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances:  Evidence from the 1992 and 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, Table 5.B., at 9 (Jan. 1997) 
(available at http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/95/bull01972.pdf).   
10
 See Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer & Brian J. Surette, Recent Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances:  Evidence from the 1995 and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, Table 5.B., at 11 (Jan. 2000) 
(available at http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/98/bull0100.pdf).   
11
 See Ana Aizcorbe, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  
Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, Table 5.B., at 13 (Jan. 2003) (available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2001/bull0103.pdf). 
12
 See Bucks, supra note 5, Table 5.B., at A13. 
13
 See John M. Griffin, Jeffrey Harris & Selim Topaloglu, The Dynamics of Institutional and Individual 
Trading, 58 J. OF FIN. 2285 (2003). 
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What do we know about these retail investors?  Retail investors can be found in 
all demographic categories.  Although it is difficult to generalize, two demographic 
trends have emerged from the studies.  Not surprisingly, perhaps, retail investors tend to 
be wealthy,14 and they tend to be older than the typical investor.15  
Although wealth is sometimes used as a proxy for sophistication, it is clear that 
the typical retail investor is not especially knowledgeable about investing.16  In a recent 
“investor literacy” survey conducted by the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”),17 only 35% of respondents were able to answer seven out of 10 basic 
questions on the securities markets and investing.18  Perhaps most shockingly, a large 
number of respondents believed that they were insured against losses from the stock 
market.19   
A relative lack of sophistication does not seem to prevent retail investors from 
putting a fair amount of money into their direct stock holdings.  While the median value 
of stock held by all families who directly own publicly-traded stock is $15,000,20 that 
number dramatically increases as the wealth and/or net income of the family increases.21  
                                                 
14
 Bucks, supra note 5, at A14. 
15
 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE & SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, supra note 3, at 12.   
16
 However, retail investors do tend to use brokers.  
17
 NASD Investor Literacy Research, Executive Summary (2003) (available at 
www.nasd.com/web/groups/inv_info/documents/investor_information/nasdw_011459.pdf).  These results 
paralleled the conclusions set forth in a 1999 report prepared by the SEC’s Office of  Investor Education 
and Assistance.  See OFFICE OF EDUCATION AND ASSISTANCE, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
THE FACTS ON SAVING AND INVESTING—EXCERPTS FROM RECENT POLLS AND STUDIES HIGHLIGHTING THE 
NEED FOR FINANCIAL EDUCATION (1999).   
18
 See NASD Investor Literacy Research, supra note 17, at 6.   
19
 Only 38% of the respondents knew that they were not insured against losses in the stock market.  46% of 
the respondents believed that their losses were insured by a government agency, such as the SEC, or a 
quasi-governmental organization, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”), or the NASD.  22% of the respondents were not sure 
if their losses were insured.  See id. 
20
 Bucks, supra note 5, Table 5.B., at A14. 
21
 Thus, for example, the median value of direct stock holdings by families in the top decile of income level 
is $57,000, and the median value of direct stock holdings by families in the top decile of net worth is 
$110,000.  See id. 
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Thus, the mean value of stock held by families who directly own publicly-traded stock is 
in excess of $160,000.22   
While the value of these direct stock holdings may be significant, the portfolios of 
retail investors indicate that they own stock in only a small number of public companies.  
The Federal Reserve Board’s SCF reports that approximately 35% of retail investors 
owned stock in only one company, and approximately 60% of retail investors owned 
stock in three or fewer companies.23   Less than 10% of retail investors owned stock in 15 
or more companies.24  Perhaps not surprisingly, retail investors also tend to own stock 
issued by their employers.25   
Although there seems to be a perception that many retail investors follow an 
aggressive “in-and-out” trading strategy, that perception is inaccurate.  An overwhelming 
number of retail investors follow a “buy and hold” investment strategy.  For example, 
according to the most recent ICI/SIA Equity Ownership in America survey, 86% of the 
respondents who directly owned publicly-traded stock agreed with the statement “I tend 
to follow a buy-and-hold investment strategy.”26  The same survey showed that 55% of 
retail investors did not conduct any stock transactions at all in 2004, and that number has 
held relatively steady through the years.27  Moreover, the typical retail investor holds 
                                                 
22
 See id.   
23
 See id. at A15. 
24
 See id.   
25
 37.1% of retail investors owned their own employer’s stock.  Id.  
26
 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE & SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, supra note 3, Figure 51, at 50 
(2005). 
27
 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE & SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, APPENDICES:  ADDITIONAL 
FIGURES FOR EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005, Figure F.1, at 16 (2005). 
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publicly-traded stock for over 15 years.28  Thus, the available information demonstrates 
that most retail investors tend to purchase securities, and then keep them.  
What about the other retail investors, those who do choose to trade?  Most engage 
in relatively few trades.  About half of these retail investors conducted five or fewer 
trades in 2004.29  However, there appears to be a large – and growing – number of retail 
investors who engage in heavy trading; the ICI/SIA survey reports that 24% of retail 
investors who conducted a retail transaction engaged in more than 12 trades during 
2004.30  Perhaps this growth in the subset of frequent traders has fueled the 
misconception that retail investors are typically heavy traders.  
Behavioral finance scholars have shown that retail investors who do trade behave 
irrationally.  Under this behavioral law and economics approach, individual investors, 
rather than behaving as rational actors, are heavily influenced by a variety of biases that 
can lead to bad investment decisions.  There is a significant amount of scholarship in the 
behavioral finance area, but a long restatement of the work on investor biases would not 
be especially helpful for purposes of this paper.  Instead, the following short statement by 
two influential law professors effectively summarizes the literature: 
The list of [investor] biases has grown impressively with time, and includes 
overconfidence, the tendency of investors to overestimate their skills; the 
endowment effect, the tendency of individuals to insist on a higher price to sell 
something they already own than to buy the same item if they do not already own 
it; loss aversion, the tendency for people to be risk averse for profit opportunities, 
but willing to gamble to avoid a loss; anchoring, the tendency for people to make 
decisions based on an initial estimate that is later adjusted, but not sufficiently to 
eliminate the influence of the initial estimate; framing, the tendency of people to 
                                                 
28
 According to the ICI/SIA survey, in 2005, the average length of individual stock ownership outside 
employer plans was 18 years, and the average length of individual stock ownership inside employer plans 
was 16 years.  See Investment Company Institute & Securities Industry Association, supra note 3, Figures 
E.3 & E.4, at 5 & 6. 
29
 See id. at Figure F.4, at 20. 
30
 See id. at Figure F.5, at 21.  In previous surveys, only 19% (1998) and 20% (2001) of trading retail 
investors engaged in more than 12 trades in one year.  See id.   
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make different choices based on how the decision is framed such as whether it is 
framed in terms of the likelihood of a good outcome or in terms of the reciprocal 
likelihood of a bad outcome; and hindsight, the tendency of people to read the 
present into assessments of the past.31   
 
Thus, for example, excessive trading by some retail investors has been traced to 
overconfidence.32 
B. The Retail Investor and False Corporate Disclosure. 
Retail investors, like all investors in the stock markets, can be defrauded by false 
corporate disclosure.  In a typical false corporate disclosure case, a company issues a 
materially false or misleading statement in press release or a mandatory disclosure 
document.  Sometimes the company issues false bad news, but more often the company 
issues false good news, perhaps in an attempt to mislead investors into thinking that 
things are much better than they really are at the company.  Following this kind of false 
statement, the company’s stock price will be artificially inflated.  When the company’s 
fraud is eventually uncovered and disclosed to the public, the company’s stock price will 
then fall.   What remedy is available to retail investors who have been defrauded by the 
issuance of false corporate disclosure? 
Although retail investors could theoretically bring their own individual actions for 
fraud, false corporate disclosure cases are almost always brought as class actions.33  The 
                                                 
31
 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:  
The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 724 (2003). 
32
 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Courage of Misguided Convictions, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS 
J. 41, 47 (1999). (stating that “[t]here is a simple and powerful explanation for high levels of trading on 
financial markets – overconfidence”).   
33
 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the class action.  Rule 23(a) states that “[o]ne 
or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class 
is so numerous that joinder of all members of is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”  See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(a).  Rule 23(b) then sets forth several other requirements that must be 
met to maintain a class action.  Federal securities fraud class actions are typically brought under Rule 
23(b)(3), which requires the court to find that “questions of law or fact common to members of the class 
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conventional wisdom is that false corporate disclosure cases give rise to a large number 
of defrauded investors who have suffered small individual damages.  Thus, it would not 
make economic sense for these investors to file individual suits.  As we know, the class 
action procedural mechanism was created to provide a remedy in this type of situation.34  
In a class action alleging false corporate disclosure, a defrauded investor brings suit on 
behalf of all similarly situated investors.  However, the named plaintiff is not in control 
of the action.  Instead, it is understood that these securities fraud class actions are lawyer-
driven.35   
C.  The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws. 
1.  Rule 10b-5. 
False corporate disclosure class actions usually allege that the defendants violated 
the general anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws, Rule 10b-5.36  To recover 
under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant made a false or 
misleading statement of material fact “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
predominate over any questions affecting individual members , and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”  See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(b).   
34
 As two scholars succinctly described: 
The most compelling [use of the class action] occurs when someone inflicts a small harm on each 
member of a large group of people.  In such a case, any one victim would have to spend more 
money to hire a lawyer than he could recover by winning a lawsuit, so he would not sue.  The 
class action enables the claims of all the individual victims to be aggregated, thereby spreading the 
lawsuit’s costs among all class members and creating a potential recovery that is large enough to 
make the suit economically viable.  Although the individual who is harmed only wins a small 
amount, the public benefit is substantial.  The costs of a large public harm are borne by the person 
or firm responsible for it, and incentives to commit future transgressions are removed. 
See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1419 (2003).    
35
 The lack of  a “real” plaintiff in securities fraud class actions was recognized by leading class action 
attorney William Lerach, who famously stated, “I have the greatest practice in the world.  I have no 
clients.”  See William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52. 
36
 Rule 10b-5 provides that it is unlawful for any person to make an “untrue statement of material fact or . . 
. omit to state a material fact necessary in order the make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.”  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
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security.37  In addition, private actions brought under Rule 10b-5 require the following 
additional elements: (1) reliance, (2) causation, (3) damages, and (4) scienter.38  In order 
to have standing to bring the action, the plaintiff must have purchased or sold the 
securities during the class period.39  Put another way, an investor who has been defrauded 
into holding securities cannot recover under Rule 10b-5. 
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 
Class actions brought under Rule 10b-5 are subject to two highly-specialized 
statutes, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “Reform Act”) and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (the “Uniform Act”). The Reform 
Act was enacted in response to a widely-held perception40 in Congress and the business 
community that Rule 10b-5 encouraged strike-suits and nuisance litigation.  According to 
these critics, professional plaintiffs – encouraged by law firms such as Milberg Weiss – 
raced to the courthouse to file suit under Rule 10b-5 whenever a company’s disclosure 
was followed by a drop in the company’s stock price, even when there was no evidence 
of fraud at the time the complaint was filed.  The critics claimed that the corporate 
defendants chose to settle even non-meritorious actions because the settlement amount 
                                                 
37
 See id.   
38
 For a good discussion of the elements necessary for plaintiffs to recover for violations of Rule 10b-5, see 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.4, at 469-72 (5th ed.). 
39
 For additional discussion of the standing requirement, see infra Part III.A.2. 
40
 For example, the Statement of Managers prepared in connection with the Reform Act provides: 
Congress has been prompted by significant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to 
enact reforms to protect investors and maintain confidence in our capital markets.  The House and 
Senate Committees heard evidence that abusive practices committed in private securities litigation 
include: (1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is 
a significant change in the issuer’s stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the 
issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible 
cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including accountants, underwriters, 
and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability; (3) 
the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for 
the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom 
they purportedly represent. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995).   
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would cost the defendant less than the litigation expenses associated with discovery 
requests.  The only people coming out ahead, argued these critics, were the plaintiff’s 
lawyers, who received large fees out of the settlement proceeds to the detriment of the 
members of the class and the corporation’s innocent shareholders. 
The Reform Act was a series of mostly procedural reforms intended to make it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to successfully bring private securities fraud actions – 
particularly false corporate disclosure actions – under Rule 10b-5.  In the Reform Act, 
Congress created several special rules of procedure that apply whenever private securities 
fraud actions are brought in federal court.  The reforms included a heightened standard 
for pleading scienter41 and a related automatic stay of discovery.42   These kinds of 
reforms were intended to weed out non-meritorious actions at the pleading stage, thereby 
discouraging strike suits.   
In addition, the Reform Act included several provisions targeted at the plaintiff 
law firms, who were understood to be the real parties in control of securities fraud class 
actions.  For example, the Reform Act imposed limitations on attorney’s fees43 and 
restricted individuals from acting as professional plaintiffs.44  Perhaps most importantly, 
                                                 
41
 Under the Reform Act’s heightened pleading standard, plaintiffs are required to “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  Securities 
Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). 
42
 The Reform Act provides: 
In any private action arising under this sub-chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be 
stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds, upon the motion of 
any party, that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue 
prejudice to that party. 
Securities Act of 1933 § 27(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
21D(b)(3)(B)(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2000). 
43
 According to the Reform Act, attorneys fees and expenses “shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of 
the amount of any damages.”  See Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (2000); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000). 
44
 The Reform Act states that “a person may be a lead plaintiff . . . in no more than 5 securities class actions  
. . . during any 3-year period.”  See Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(3)(B)(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi) 
(2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000). 
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the Reform Act adopted a “lead plaintiff” provision,45 which requires courts to presume 
that the plaintiff entitled to control the class action (and therefore appoint class counsel) 
is the member of the class with the greatest loss, as opposed to the first plaintiff to file the 
action.46  By reducing the incentive to file first, the Reform Act sought to encourage law 
firms to investigate claims before bringing actions.  Similarly, by reducing the 
significance of the professional plaintiff, the Reform Act attempted to impose increased 
plaintiff monitoring of the performance and fees of class counsel.  
3.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 
 The Reform Act tried to correct the causes of nuisance litigation by creating 
special procedural rules that apply only to private securities fraud actions.  Because these 
rules are procedural in nature, they apply only if the securities fraud action is filed in 
federal district court.  Soon after the Reform Act was enacted, it became apparent that the 
Reform Act could be evaded if plaintiffs chose to file a complaint under state law47 in 
state court.48  When Congress discovered that the Reform Act could be so easily 
circumvented, they responded by enacting the Uniform Act.49 
                                                 
45
 See Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2000). 
46
 Specifically, the lead plaintiff provision requires the court to “appoint as lead plaintiff the member or 
members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately 
representing the interests of class members . . .”  See Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 
77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) 
(B)(i)(2000).  The provision then requires the court to adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff 
is the person or persons who “has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”  See 
Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B) )(iii)(I)(bb) (2000); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B) )(iii)(I)(bb), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2000).   
47
 For example, a plaintiff could file an action for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the applicable 
state blue sky laws and/or state common law.   
48
 The plaintiff could not bring an action in state court under Rule 10b-5 because the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 provides that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the Exchange 
Act.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000).   
49
 According to the “findings” provision of the Uniform Act: 
(1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 sought to prevent abuses in private 
securities fraud lawsuits; 
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 The Uniform Act expressly preempts state securities fraud50 class actions, 
including false corporate disclosure cases, involving nationally-traded securities.51  If the 
Uniform Act applies, plaintiffs must bring their claims under Rule 10b-5 in federal 
district court.  Although the Uniform Act preempts most securities fraud class actions, 
certain state claims continue to survive.52  For example, because the Uniform Act applies 
only to class actions,53 investors can bring individual actions on their own behalf under 
state law in state court.  In addition, the Uniform Act does not apply to derivative 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence has been presented to Congress that 
a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts; 
(3) this shift has prevented the Act from fully achieving its objectives; 
(4) State securities regulation is of continuing importance, together with Federal regulation of 
securities, to protect investors and promote strong financial markets; 
(5) In order to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from 
being used to frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving 
nationally-traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State 
securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits. 
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1-2 (1998). 
50
 It is somewhat of an oversimplification to state that the Uniform Act preempts “fraud” actions.  While 
the Uniform Act clearly preempts securities fraud claims, several courts have interpreted the Uniform Act 
to preempt claims that do not sound in fraud.  For a discussion of the types of non-fraud claims that have 
been preempted by the Uniform Act, see Jennifer O’Hare, Preemption under the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act:  If It Looks Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim 
Is It a Securities Fraud Claim? 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 348-52 (2004).  However, for ease of reference, I will 
continue to describe the Uniform Act as preempting state securities fraud claims.   
 
51
 The Uniform Act’s preemption provision states: 
 No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision 
thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging – 
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security; or 
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. 
See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(1), 15 
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).  According to the Uniform Act, a “covered security” includes “nationally-traded 
securities.”   
52
 For a discussion of the claims that are not preempted by the Uniform Act, see O’Hare, supra note 50, at 
339-341. 
53
 The Uniform Act preempts “covered class actions.”  A covered class action is much broader than a Rule 
23 class action and includes (1) actions brought on behalf of more than 50 persons, (2) actions brought on a 
representative basis, and (3) a group of joined or consolidated actions.  See Securities Act of 1933 § 
16(f)(2),15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5).  
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actions54 brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation or actions brought by state 
governments or state pension plans.55  Thus, these actions survive preemption.   
III.  The Treatment of Retail Investors Under Rule 10b-5. 
Rule 10b-5 appears to protect all investors from securities fraud.  The language of 
the rule is focused on illegal conduct, not on the persons harmed by the illegal conduct.   
Specifically, Rule 10b-5 states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any 
untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”56  On its face, 
then, Rule 10b-5 does not distinguish between different types of investors, whether those 
investors are unsophisticated retirees or powerhouse public pension funds like 
CalPERS.57   
Presumably, then, retail investors and institutional investors seeking redress for 
securities fraud should receive the same protections under law.  But that is not the case.58 
As described below, in several important respects, retail investors and institutional 
                                                 
54
 See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(f)(2)(C),15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(C); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
28(f)(5)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(C). 
55
 See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(2),15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(3), 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3). 
 
56
 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
57
 CalPERS, the California Public Employees Retirement System, is the largest public pension fund in the 
United States and is well-known for its shareholder activism.  See, e.g., Brad M. Barber, Monitoring the 
Monitor:  Evaluating CalPERS’ Activism, Nov. 2006, available at SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=890321. 
58
 A commentator has reached a similar conclusion as to the differing treatment received by sophisticated 
investors and unsophisticated investors under the federal securities laws.  See C. Edward Fletcher, III, 
Sophisticated Investors under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L. J. 1081 (providing an exhaustive 
analysis of how the federal securities laws treat sophisticated investors).  This commentator argues that it 
may be appropriate for the federal securities laws to provide less protection to sophisticated investors, 
particularly under Rule 10b-5.  See id. at 1141-47.   In reaching this conclusion, the author assumes that 
unsophisticated investors should be afforded greater protections under federal law in general and the Rule 
10b-5 in particular.  Of course, my paper shows that courts have not, in fact, afforded greater protections 
under Rule 10b-5 to retail investors, who are often unsophisticated.   
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investors are treated differently under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws.  Moreover, as compared to institutional investors, retail investors appear to receive 
disfavored treatment under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
A.  Differing Treatment under Rule 10b-5. 
1.  Retail Investors Who Are Members of Securities Fraud Class Actions Are 
Disfavored by the Federal Securities Laws. 
A class action for violations of Rule 10b-5 can be brought on behalf of investors 
who purchased securities during the class period; i.e., after the company issued a false 
corporate disclosure, but before the company made corrective disclosure.59  Retail 
investors who purchased securities during the class period, and therefore qualify to be  
members of a securities fraud class action, will find that they are disadvantaged in several 
important ways.   
a.  The Lead Plaintiff Provision. 
First, while Rule 10b-5 does not distinguish between retail investors and 
institutional investors, the Reform Act does make such a distinction, through the lead 
plaintiff provision.  As discussed above,60 the lead plaintiff provision includes a 
rebuttable presumption requiring the court to appoint the plaintiff with the greatest 
financial stake as the party who will make decisions on behalf of the rest of the class.  
The rebuttable presumption is neutral on its face; the statute’s language does not 
distinguish between retail investors and institutional investors.  But in practice, the lead 
plaintiff provision benefits institutional investors because, not surprisingly, the plaintiff 
                                                 
59
 This statement assumes that the company issued false positive news.  If a corporation issued false 
negative news, then a class action would be brought on behalf of investors who sold their securities during 
the class period.   
60
 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.  
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with the greatest financial stake is usually an institutional investor.  This result was 
intended by Congress; the Reform Act’s legislative history states that the purpose of the 
lead plaintiff provision was “to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will 
serve as lead plaintiffs.”61 
Recent empirical studies have demonstrated that this result has occurred.  While 
institutional investors initially were slow to take advantage of the lead plaintiff provision, 
they now are much more aggressive in seeking appointment.62  Thus, for example, 
institutional investors were lead plaintiffs in 41% of securities class action filed in 2003, 
and were lead plaintiffs in 47% of the securities class actions filed in 2004.63  The trend 
has continued.64 
In applying the lead plaintiff provision, courts prefer institutional investors over 
retail investors.  Following a sweeping study of judicial opinions concerning the 
appointment of a lead plaintiff,65 Professors James Cox and Randall Thomas concluded 
that courts “found in [the institutional investor’s] favor in the vast majority of cases in 
which an institutional investor was competing for the position of lead [plaintiff].”66  
                                                 
61
 See H. REP. NO. 104-369, supra note 40. 
62
 See Stephen J. Choi, et al., Do Institutions Matter?  The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 869, 877-78 (2005); James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:  Does the Plaintiff Matter?  An Empirical Analysis of 
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006); Michael A. Perino, 
Institutional Activision Through Litigation:  An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in 
Securities Class Actions (October 2006), St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-0055, available at 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=038722.  
63
 See 2004 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 15 (2004) (available at 
www.10b5.com/2004_study.pdf). 
64
 The most recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers study reported that unions or pension funds were lead 
plaintiffs in 68 of the 168 securities class actions filed in 2005, which amounts to approximately 41%  of 
the cases filed.  The study did not report the number of other types of institutional investors serving as lead 
plaintiffs; i.e., mutual funds and private pension funds.  Therefore, the overall percentage of cases having 
institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in 2004 is probably slightly higher.  See 2005 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 21 & 8 (2005).   
65
 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 62, at 1587 (analyzing 129 reported opinions). 
66
 The study’s authors note two caveats to this statement:   
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Retail investors who attempt to join together to aggregate67 their damages so that the 
group will have the largest losses may also find it hard to prevail.68   
At first glance, the lead plaintiff provision seems like a positive development for 
retail investors.  Institutional investors appear to have the economic incentive and 
expertise to more effectively manage a securities fraud class action and monitor the 
performance and fees of class counsel than the typical retail investor.  However, recent 
empirical studies show that the performance of institutional lead plaintiffs has been 
mixed.69  Thus, it is not entirely clear that preferring institutional lead plaintiffs to 
individual lead plaintiffs is a positive development for retail investors.   
In addition, critics of the lead plaintiff provision have argued that the rebuttable 
presumption favoring institutional lead plaintiffs could harm small investors.  One 
obvious concern is that the lead plaintiff provision acts to deprive retail investors from 
obtaining any real control over the class action.70  An additional concern is that 
                                                                                                                                                 
First, courts were willing to select groups of individuals over institutions in situations where the 
institutions did not have large shareholdings in the company that was the subject of the litigation, 
especially where the court exhibited concerns about the typicality of the institutional investor as a 
class representative.  Second, in several cases, courts accepted groups of institutions and 
individuals over their competitors where they found such groups to have the largest stake in the 
defendant company. 
See id. at 1619. 
67
 See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel under 
the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 65-78 (2001). 
68
 See Choi, et al., supra note 62, at 878 (stating that there is an “evolving judicial preference for a single 
institutional lead plaintiff over a large group of individuals”). 
69
 See id. at 902 (finding “mixed results” as to the effects of institutional investors serving as lead 
plaintiffs); Cox & Thomas, supra note 62, at 1636 (concluding that “institutional lead plaintiffs add value 
for shareholders, although perhaps not as much as was expected by the architects of . . . the lead plaintiff 
provision”); Perino, supra note 62, at 3 (finding that “public pension funds do act as effective monitors of 
class counsel”). 
70
 As one noted commentator observed: 
To the extent that the Reform Act allows small shareholders to file suit but permits institutional 
investors to take control of the litigation away from the filing plaintiff, it preserves for the small 
investor only the opportunity to incur the costs associated with drafting and filing a complaint and 
eliminates meaningful access to the judicial system. 
See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform:  Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 547 
(1997).   
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institutional investors have conflicts of interest that might prevent them from obtaining 
the best recovery for the class, which includes retail investors.71  For example, an 
institutional investor might own a large amount of the defendant company’s stock during 
the pendency of the class action, but may have suffered comparatively small damages 
from the fraud.  Because this institutional investor is a current shareholder of the 
company, it would be in this institutional investor’s interest to limit the settlement 
amount.72  These concerns were raised at the time the Reform Act was enacted73 and 
remain concerns today.74 
b. The Materiality Standard. 
Retail investors may also find that judicial application of Rule 10b-5’s materiality 
standard can disfavor their claims.  To recover under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant made a false or misleading statement of “material” fact.75  
According to the seminal case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, information is 
material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it 
                                                 
71
 For a discussion of potential conflicts of interest by institutional lead plaintiffs, see id. at 545-49.   See 
also Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors in Securities 
Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1409-1412 (2001). 
72
 As one commentator has noted, “With respect to the desirability of large payments of compensatory 
damages, the interests of continuing shareholders will thus generally conflict with those of class members 
who have sold their shares and who, consequently, have no interest in the continued health of the business.”  
Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1505 
(1996).  Ironically, such a lead plaintiff might actually benefit many retail investors, those who purchased 
their stock before the false corporate publicity and continued to hold the stock through the securities fraud 
class action.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
73
 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, supra note __ (recognizing that “potential conflicts . . . could be caused by the 
shareholder with the ‘largest financial stake’ serving as lead plaintiff”).  According to the Conference 
Report, the danger that an institutional investor might have a conflicts of interest is alleviated because the 
lead plaintiff presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing that the lead plaintiff cannot adequately 
represent the interests of the class.  See id.   
74
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implemention, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1561-62 (2006) (stating that the interests of retail investors “are 
unlikely to be given serious consideration in securities litigation today because control of the securities 
class action was presumptively assigned by the PSLRA to large diversified investors, who often have 
highly contrary interests”).   
75
 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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important in deciding how to [act].”76  The TSC Industries definition is an objective test.  
In determining materiality, courts are not supposed to determine what a particular 
investor would consider important, or what the judge would consider important, but 
rather what a theoretical “reasonable investor” would consider important.  Of course, that 
begs the question of what kind of reasonable investor:  a reasonable retail investor?  Or a 
reasonable institutional investor?   
Courts rarely address the distinction between retail investors and institutional 
investors in analyzing materiality.  This failure is strange, considering that a reasonable 
retail investor and reasonable institutional investor undoubtedly receive and process 
information in very different ways.  Retail investors are more likely to receive 
information from fewer sources, and through less “reliable” sources, such as Internet chat 
rooms and message boards.  Moreover, since retail investors are typically less 
sophisticated than institutional investors, they may not be able to fully appreciate the 
information they review.  In addition, while institutional investors may have teams of 
experts analyzing the importance of a particular disclosure, retail investors generally rely 
on themselves.  Nonetheless, courts apply a unitary materiality standard that can disfavor 
many retail investors.   
A good example of how the application of the materiality standard can disfavor 
retail investors is the puffery defense.  “Puffery” is a statement that is so vague, 
optimistic, or promotional in nature that the court concludes, as a matter of law, that no 
reasonable investor could find it important in making an investment decision.77  Retail 
investors – who are typically less sophisticated than institutional investors – may in fact 
                                                 
76
 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976). 
77
 See Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo:  The Unfortunate Reemergence of the Puffery 
Defense in Private Securities Class Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1698 (1998) (defining puffery). 
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be defrauded by false statements of corporate optimism that would be discounted by 
more sophisticated investors.  However, these retail investors would be unable to recover 
under the federal securities laws because a court would likely conclude that the optimistic 
statement constituted puffery.  In other words, according to the puffery defense, no 
reasonable investor could have considered the information important in deciding whether 
to purchase or sell a security. 
But retail investors can be affected by what courts might see as immaterial 
puffery.  Behavioral finance scholars have theorized that it may be perfectly reasonable 
for retail investors to find “puffery” to be important to their investment decisions.  For 
example, Professor Donald Langevoort has argued that cognitive biases, especially 
investor overconfidence, can lead individual investors to make trading decisions based on 
puffery.78  He analyzed the familiar false corporate disclosure case:  a company with a 
history of successes, but which hits bad times, continues to make generalized statements 
that things are going well, even though they aren’t.  In such a case, a court might be 
tempted to dismiss the optimistic statement as puffery, but Professor Langevoort cautions 
against this conclusion.  As he points out, “behavioral finance suggests that investors do 
extrapolate too readily and see in past successes too much likelihood of future gains.  
Indeed, prospective future gains are probably the impetus for continuing buying activity 
among investors, especially if analysts are also recommending the stock or estimating 
continued earnings growth.”79  He also notes that if the company’s optimistic statements 
attracted significant media coverage, investors would be even more likely to be 
                                                 
78
 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:  A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 185 (2002).  
79
 See id.  
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influenced by them.80  Thus, cognitive biases may lead retail investors to place 
importance on information that would be defined as puffery by many courts.81 
Some courts seemed to have recognized that the application of the TSC Industries 
definition of materiality may disadvantage defrauded retail investors.  Professor Margaret 
Sachs has recently examined judicial application of the materiality standard in 
enforcement actions brought against fraudulent schemes that are specifically aimed at 
vulnerable investors, such as unsophisticated or elderly investors.82  In these schemes, 
unscrupulous promoters use over-the-top claims of sky high returns and low risk to 
induce these targeted retail investors to part with their money.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has regularly brought enforcement actions in these types of cases, 
but this puts the federal district courts in a difficult position.  On the one hand, the 
statements pretty clearly constitute puffery, which should cause the judges to dismiss the 
actions.  On the other hand, the judges undoubtedly recognize that many investors did in 
fact find the puffery to be important in their investment decisions.  A straightforward 
application of the materiality standard would mean that the defendants could not be 
stopped from defrauding investors.  Professor Sachs shows that some courts have 
misapplied the TSC Industries materiality standard to permit the enforcement actions to 
go forward.83 
                                                 
80
 See id.  
81
 While overconfidence may be the most significant cognitive bias undercutting the puffery defense, it is 
not the only one.  Loss aversion is another.  See David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational 
Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 586 (stating that “[i]nvestors whose stock has lost value are risk 
seeking and more likely to act on positive disclosures with weak information content”).   Other biases that 
may lead retail investors to consider “puffery” in their investment decisions include information overload, 
source blindness, and herd behavior.  See id. at 587. 
82
 See Margaret Sachs, Materiality and Social Change:  The Case for Replacing “The Reasonable 
Investor” With “The Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473 (2006). 
83
 See id. at 497-501.  Professor Sachs identified three ways courts are misapplying the TSC Industries 
standard of materiality.   One approach is to find statements promising unbelievable returns to be material 
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2.  Retail Investors Often Do Not Have Any Private Remedies for Securities 
Fraud. 
The above discussion84 provides examples of ways in which retail investors who 
are members of a securities fraud class action receive disfavored treatment under Rule 
10b-5.  Many defrauded retail investors, however, will not even qualify to be members of 
the class action in the first place.  As discussed above,85 the overwhelming majority of 
retail investors follow a “buy and hold” strategy.  While this may be a solid approach for 
achieving long-term financial gains, it is not the best approach for obtaining a remedy 
under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  This is because investors 
who have been defrauded into holding their securities do not have standing to recover 
under Rule 10b-5.   
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the United States Supreme Court held 
that standing under Rule 10b-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers.86  This 
purchaser/seller standing rule means that only investors who purchased stock during a 
period of false positive corporate disclosure, or, conversely, who sold stock during a 
period of false negative corporate disclosure, can recover under Rule 10b-5.  In Blue Chip 
Stamps, the Court recognized that this standing rule could “prevent[] some deserving 
plaintiffs from recovering damages which have in fact been caused by violations of Rule 
10b-5.”87  However, the Court pointed out that the potential unfairness of the purchaser-
seller standing requirement was mitigated because state law, as opposed to federal law, 
                                                                                                                                                 
because the statements are “related to the very substance of the act of investing.”  See id. at 498.  Another 
approach is to concentrate on the falsity of the statement, while giving little or no analysis to the materiality 
of the false statement.  See id. at 499.  The final approach is to ignore the contextual nature of the TSC 
Industries materiality standard.  See id. at 500. 
84
 See supra Part III.A.1. 
85
 See supra notes 26 -28 and accompanying text. 
86
 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975). 
87
 See id. at 738. 
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permitted investors to recover if they had been defrauded into holding their securities.88  
Thus, Blue Chip Stamps foreclosed defrauded holders of securities from recovering under 
Rule 10b-5. 
Retail investors are likely to be holders within the meaning of the Blue Chip 
Stamps standing requirement.  Because retail investors tend to purchase securities and 
then hold them for long periods of time, retail investors are likely to have purchased their 
securities before the start of the class period.89  Thus, these retail investors will not be 
able to join a securities fraud class action.  Commentators have noted that retail investors 
are the “clear losers” under this system.90  Thus, for the vast majority of retail investors, 
Rule 10b-5 is simply irrelevant as a remedy for securities fraud.91 
Retail investors who have been defrauded into holding their securities are also 
foreclosed from recovering under state law.  Although some states do permit holding 
claims,92 the United States Supreme Court recently held that the Uniform Act preempts 
class actions claiming that investors had been defrauded into holding their stock.93  In 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, the Supreme Court was asked to 
decide whether fraud that induced investors to hold securities constituted fraud “in 
                                                 
88
 See id. at 739 n.9. 
89
 See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1560 (stating that “because of their typically longer holding period, 
individual ‘buy and hold’ investors are more likely to have purchased their stock before the class period 
commenced”); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 639, 649-50 (1996) (noting that investors following a buy and hold strategy “make it somewhat more 
likely that they will be non-trading shareholders of an issuer defendant (and suffer their share of the 
resulting loss) than members of the plaintiff class who stand to gain from the settlement or judgement”).     
90
 See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1560. (stating that “[t]he clearest loser is the small investor who buys and 
holds for retirement – exactly the profile of the American retail investor”). 
91
 Of course, Rule 10b-5 may still be relevant to retail investors to the extent that it deters securities fraud.  
However, many scholars agree that securities fraud class actions brought under Rule10b-5 offer only 
limited deterrence value.  See, e.g., id. at 1547-56. 
92
 For a discussion of states that permit holding claims, see Joshua Ratner, Note, Stockholders’ Holding 
Claim Class Actions under State Law after the Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 
1039-40 (2001).  Subsequent to that Note, the California Supreme Court has also recognized holding 
claims.  See Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1264-65 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
93
 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, __; 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1514 (2006). 
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connection with” the purchase or sale of a security within the meaning of the Uniform 
Act.  According to the Supreme Court, it did.  Thus, the Court concluded that the 
preemptive force of the Uniform Act reached holding claims.  The Dabit Court was 
patently unsympathetic to the argument that its decision would mean that many investors 
would be left without any remedy at all.  The Court stated: 
[W]e do not here revisit the Blue Chip Stamps Court’s understanding of the 
equities involved in limiting the availability of private remedies under federal 
law; we are concerned instead with Congress’ intent in adopting a preemption 
provision, the evident purpose of which is to limit the availability of remedies 
under state law.94 
 
Thus, following Dabit, federal law ensures that many retail investors are without an 
effective private remedy, either under federal or state law.95 
Certainly, institutional investors also engage in “buy and hold” strategies, and to 
the extent that they do, they will also be limited by the actual purchaser or seller standing 
requirement.  Thus, it could be argued that retail investors, as such, are not disfavored 
under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, but rather that holders of securities 
– whoever they are -- are disfavored under the federal securities laws.  That may be true, 
but retail investors suffer disproportionately from the Blue Chip Stamps standing 
requirement and the Dabit decision.  First, the standing limitation rather uniquely impacts 
retail investors, because they are much more likely to hold securities than institutional 
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 See id. at __ n. 13. 
95
 To add insult to injury, these investors must then watch the value of their stock decline as the company 
settles class actions brought on behalf of defrauded purchasers who are permitted to recover under Rule 
10b-5.  As we know, private securities fraud class actions lead to wealth transfers.  See, e.g., Alexander, 
supra note 72, at 1503 (stating that “[i]t is often said that settlements are, in large part, a transfer of wealth 
from current shareholders to former shareholders”).  When a company settles a private securities fraud 
class action, wealth is transferred from investors who are shareholders at the time the settlement is paid 
(current shareholders) to defrauded investors who purchased during the class period (class members).  If a 
current shareholder is also a class member, then wealth is essentially transferred from the current 
shareholder back to himself.  However, if a current shareholder is not a member of the class – for example, 
because the current shareholder purchased his stock before the company issued the false corporate 
disclosure and continues to hold the stock – then wealth is transferred away from the current shareholder.  
This is precisely the situation of the typical retail investor.   
 26 
investors.  In addition, a typical retail investor who has been defrauded into holding 
securities will feel the bite of the fraud more than an institutional investor.  Retail 
investors directly invest in the stock of relatively few companies.96  If a retail investor is 
unlucky enough to hold stock in a company that has violated Rule 10b-5, the overall 
value of his stock portfolio will be undoubtedly significantly impacted.  A more 
diversified investor would still be harmed, but the extent of the harm would be reduced 
because he had not disproportionately invested in the defrauding company’s securities.  
Finally, as discussed below,97 an institutional investor who has been defrauded into 
holding securities can circumvent both the Blue Chips Stamps standing requirement and 
the Dabit decision by bringing an individual action under state law in state court.  Retail 
investors generally do not have that opportunity. 
3.  The Reform Act and the Uniform Act Create a Two-Tiered System of Investor 
Remedies for Securities Fraud That Disfavors Retail Investors.   
As discussed above,98 the combined effect of the Reform Act and the Uniform 
Act makes federal district court the “exclusive venue for most securities class action 
lawsuits.”99  Thus, retail investors, who ordinarily have to use the class action vehicle to 
recover damages for securities fraud,100 must pursue their claims under federal law in 
federal court, where they will be subject to the Reform Act.  Institutional investors, 
however, are in a very different position.   
Because institutional investors may have suffered substantial losses from a 
company’s securities fraud, they may find it economically feasible to “opt out” of a class 
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 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.   
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 See infra Part III.A.3. 
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 See supra Part II.C.3.  
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 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-803, supra note 49. 
100
 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
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action101 in order to file their own individual action.102  Why would an institutional 
investor choose to opt out of a securities fraud class action filed in federal district court?   
The answer must be that the institutional investor believes it will get a better recovery if it 
directly pursues its own claim, as opposed to relying on the class action.103  The 
institutional investor might believe it has stronger negotiating skills than the class 
counsel, so that the institutional investor has a better chance of obtaining a larger 
settlement by negotiating directly with the defendants.  Or perhaps the institutional 
investor would prefer to work with its own lawyers, as opposed to the class counsel. 
But there is another reason why the institutional investor might believe that it can 
obtain a larger settlement by opting out of the federal securities class action.  Opting out 
permits the institutional investor to circumvent the Uniform Act; it enables the 
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 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit members of a class to opt out of the class action.  Rule 23 
states that all members of a class must be notified that “the court will exclude from the class any member 
who requests exclusion.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. § 23(c)(2)(B).  Rule 23 also permits a court to “refuse to 
approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members 
who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. § 23(e)(3). 
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 This individual securities fraud action could be filed in either federal court or state court.  If it is filed in 
federal court, the Reform Act would still apply; the Reform Act generally applies to all securities fraud 
actions, whether brought as class actions, or on an individual basis.  Thus, the heightened pleading standard 
for scienter and the automatic stay of discovery would apply to an individual action brought by an 
institutional investor in federal district court.  One exception would be the lead plaintiff provision, which 
by its terms only applies to class actions.  Compare, e.g., Securities Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (stating that “in any private action . . .”) with Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(3)(B)(i), 15 
U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) 
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that is brought as a plaintiff class action . . .”) (emphasis supplied).  Therefore, as discussed below, the 
institutional investor might find it advantageous to file in state court.   
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 Whether an institutional investor will actually obtain a better recovery by opting out of a class action is 
unclear.  Institutional investors who have opted out often state that their recovery was much greater than 
the recovery they would have received if they had remained in the class action.  See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, 
Time Warner Settles With Institutions for $400 Million, N.Y. SUN, March 1, 2007 (quoting lawyer for 
institutional investor as saying that its opt out recovery was “between 16 and 24 times what we would  have 
gotten through the class”); Stephen Taub, “Opt Out” Plaintiffs Settle With WorldCom, CFO.COM, Oct. 19, 
2005 (stating that institutional investors claimed to have received “three times more money than they would 
have received had they joined in the class action”).  However, class action lawyers and lawyers 
representing the institutional investors who have opted out of the class action often disagree as to whether 
the institutional investor received larger recoveries in the individual action.  See, e.g., Stephen Taub, Class 
Action and “Opt Out” Lawyers Duke It Out, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Nov. 8, 2005.   
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institutional investor to bring its action under state law in state court.104  Because the 
Uniform Act preempts only state class actions,105 individual actions can be brought in the 
friendlier environs of state court.  Moreover, the Uniform Act expressly permits state and 
local public pension funds to file state class actions in state court.106  In either situation, 
the state action will not be subject to the restrictive procedural provisions of the Reform 
Act.  Specifically, state rules of civil procedure do not impose heightened pleading 
standard for scienter, nor do they provide for an automatic stay of discovery.  Without the 
heightened pleading standard and automatic stay of discovery, the institutional investor 
will be more likely to survive a motion to dismiss and therefore has increased leverage in 
settlement negotiations.   
Moreover, state securities law tends to be much more attractive to defrauded 
investors than Rule 10b-5.  For example, many state blue sky laws provide buyers with 
an express private right of action for rescission if the seller offered or sold the security by 
means of a false or misleading statement of material fact.107  For plaintiffs, there are 
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 In addition, some institutional investors have opted out of federal securities class actions to bring 
individual actions Rule 10b-5.  Although there may be several reasons why the institutional investor might 
choose federal law over state law, the most obvious explanation is that the statute of limitations for the state 
claims may have expired.  Note also that some institutional investors have opted out of federal securities 
class actions to bring individual actions under federal securities law in state court.  These federal claims are 
brought under Section 11 and Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, which are not required to be 
brought in federal district court.  The plaintiffs can then combine the ’33 Act claims with state law claims.    
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 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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 The Uniform Act provides that: 
nothing in this section may be construed to preclude a State or political subdivision thereof or a 
State pension plan from bringing an action involving a covered security on its own behalf, or as a 
member of a class comprised solely of other States, political subdivisions, or State pension plans 
that are named plaintiffs, and that have authorized participation, in such action. 
See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(2),15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(3), 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3). 
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 For example, the Uniform Securities Act provides that “[a] person is liable to the person buying the 
security from the person for the consideration paid for the security . . . if the seller offers or sells a security . 
. . by means of any untrue statement of material fact or any omission of a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . 
.”  See Uniform Securities Act (1956) § 410(a)(2).  Later versions of the Uniform Securities Act are similar.  
See Uniform Securities Act (1985) § 605; Uniform Securities Act (2002) § 509. 
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several advantages to this statute.  The plaintiff need not show reliance or causation or 
damages.  Moreover, the plaintiff need not show that the seller acted with scienter.108  But 
the statute is not a cure-all for defrauded plaintiffs.  Because the blue sky statute requires 
privity with the seller for the buyer to recover, the statute cannot be used by purchasers 
who purchased stock on the open market.  Still, for purchasers who are able to establish 
privity – such as purchasers who received stock in connection with a merger or 
purchasers who bought stock directly from the issuer – the statute is much more attractive 
than Rule 10b-5.  Clearly, institutional investors who are able to take advantages of this 
state statute are in a much stronger negotiating position than retail investors who can look 
only to Rule 10b-5 to recover.  For example, the State of Alaska opted out of the AOL-
Time Warner federal securities fraud class action to pursue an individual state securities 
fraud action pursuant to the Alaska version of this rescission statute.109  Published reports 
indicate that the State of Alaska settled its claim for 83 cents on the dollar, far more than 
what was received by members of the federal securities class action.110  
In addition to state statutory claims, state common law claims can also be more 
attractive than claims brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5.  For example, state common law 
may permit investors to bring suit for negligent misrepresentation if a company has 
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 The Uniform Securities Act (1956) appears to be a strict liability offense, while the 1985 and 2002 
versions of the Uniform Act provide the seller with a due diligence defense.  
109
 The Alaska statute provides that “[a] person is liable to the person buying the security from the person 
for the consideration paid for the security . . . by means of an untrue statement of a material fact, or omits to 
state a material fact, the omission of which makes a statement misleading.”   See ALASKA STAT. § 
45.55.930(a)(2) (Michie 2007).    
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 Josh Gerstein, Time Warner Case Finds a Surprise, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 7, 2006 (stating that the State of 
Alaska’s settlement “appears to be far superior to the payout in the nationwide settlement, which has not 
been calculated officially but is likely to be a few cents on the dollar, according to lawyers involved in the 
litigation”). 
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issued false corporate disclosure.111  Because a plaintiff need only show that the 
defendant acted unreasonably, as opposed to recklessly or knowingly, the plaintiff may 
find it much easier to prevail with a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 
State common law also may permit plaintiffs to bring claims that are not 
permitted under the federal securities laws.  As discussed above,112 investors who have 
been defrauded into holding securities are not permitted to recover under Rule 10b-5.  
Several states, however, do permit holding claims.113  Moreover, while the Supreme 
Court held that there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting a violation of 
Rule 10b-5,114 almost all states permit plaintiffs to recover against defendants who have 
aided and abetted a violation of state securities law.115   
Thus, put simply, the institutional investor bringing an individual securities fraud 
action under state law in state court should be able to obtain a better settlement than if the 
institutional investor remained in the federal securities class action.  This opportunity is 
not just theoretical; opt outs have seemingly occurred in all of the recent big securities 
fraud cases.  Institutional investors have already begun opting out of class actions to 
pursue their own individual actions under state law in state court.116  And plaintiff law 
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 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS LOWENFELS, 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & 
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 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.   
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 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.   
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 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
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 See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 111, at § 2:200.  According to testimony given by the SEC in 
connection with the passage of the Uniform Act, 49 states permit aiding-and-abetting liability.  See 
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29, 1997, at 19. 
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 For example, the Retirement Systems of Alabama opted out of the WorldCom securities fraud class 
action to pursue its own individual action under state law in state court.  It ultimately settled with the 
investment bank defendants for $111 million.  See Susanna Craig, Bear Stearns Continues Its Contrarian 
Ways – Securities Firm Resists Settling a Lawsuit Linked to WorldCom for a Fight in Alabama, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, at C1 (Nov. 8, 2004).   Similarly, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
opted out of the AOL-TimeWarner securities class action to pursue its own individual action under state 
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firms, who have recognized an attractive new litigation opportunity, have been aggressive 
in educating institutional investors about the potential benefits of opting out to file 
individual actions under state law in state court.117 Retail investors simply do not have 
this opportunity.  Together, the Reform Act and the Uniform Act have created a two-
tiered system of investor remedies for securities fraud, one that gives privileged treatment 
to institutional investors. 
4.  Summary. 
Retail investors who have been defrauded by false corporate disclosures will be 
disappointed by the remedies provided by Rule 10b-5.  If retail investors happened to 
have purchased the company’s stock during the period of fraud, they might recover 
something in a federal securities fraud class action, assuming they are able to overcome 
the significant obstacles imposed by the Reform Act.  But these retail investors will often 
lose the opportunity to manage the class action to an institutional investor and may find 
that courts are unsympathetic to claims based on misleading optimistic corporate 
statements.  If retail investors did not purchase the company’s stock during the period of 
fraud, but were defrauded into holding their stock – a far more likely situation for retail 
investors – they have no remedy at all, either under federal law or state law.  In addition, 
if they continue to hold stock in the company when the company settles the securities 
fraud class action, these retail investors will suffer again, as money is drained from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
law in state court.  It ultimately settled for $105 million.  See CalSTRS Settles AOL/TimeWarner Securities 
Fraud Suit (Feb. 7, 2007) (available at http:/calstrs.com/newsroom/2007/news020707.aspx).   
117
 Sometimes, the plaintiff law firms have been too aggressive in encouraging institutional investors to opt 
out of a class action.  Milberg Weiss, for example, was publicly criticized by a federal district judge for 
certain actions it took in pursuing opt outs from the WorldCom securities fraud class action.  See In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), Opinion and Order, at 15-17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 
2003) (stating that “Milberg Weiss does not appear to have presented a forthright description of the 
advantages and disadvantages of both the individual action and class action options”).   See also Anthony 
Lin, Milberg Weiss Taken to Task for Conduct in WorldCom Case, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 2003.   
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company to pay class members.  And in either situation, retail investors can only stand by 
and watch as defrauded institutional investors are permitted to pick and choose which law 
and forum offers them the most attractive chance for recovery.  The typical retail investor 
does not have this opportunity.   
B. Is the Disfavored Treatment of Retail Investors under Rule 10b-5 Intentional? 
As discussed above,118 the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have 
the effect of disfavoring retail investors in several significant ways.  But is the disfavored 
treatment intentional?  It does not appear so.  Instead, retail investors often seem to be 
simply overlooked.  With the institutionalization of stock ownership, the focus of the 
federal securities laws in general, and of Rule 10b-5 in particular, has been on the role 
played by institutional investors.  Not much attention is given to the plight of the 
defrauded retail investor:  not by Congress, not by the courts, and not by legal scholars.  
Only the SEC has recognized – in a limited fashion -- that a retail investor is a specific 
type of investor who sometimes needs special protections under the antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws.   
In recent years, Congress has generally evidenced more of a concern with 
protecting corporations and other deep pocket defendants than with protecting defrauded 
investors, whether the defrauded investors are institutional investors or retail investors.  
The Reform Act is an obvious example.  Although the legislative history recites that one 
of the primary purposes of the Reform Act is to “protect investors,”119 Congress is not 
referring to defrauded investors.  Instead, the focus of Congressional concern is on the 
“innocent shareholders” of corporations that are forced to pay settlements in frivolous 
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 See supra Part III.A. 
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 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, supra note 40, (stating that “[t]he overriding purpose of our Nation’s securities 
laws is to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets”). 
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actions.  As the Conference Report states, “[i]nvestors are always the ultimate losers 
when extortionate ‘settlements’ are extracted from issuers.”120  In fact, in the Conference 
Report, there is only one indirect reference to the defrauded retail investor:  in the 
discussion of the lead plaintiff provision.  In this discussion, the Conference Report notes 
that institutional investors will be able to represent the interests of “small investors” more 
effectively than an investor with a small stake in the outcome of the class action.121  
Because Congress had been persuaded that securities fraud class actions were generally 
non-meritorious, it is understandable that the Reform Act’s legislative history does not 
reveal more of a concern for defrauded investors.   
The Uniform Act reflects a similar disinterest in defrauded investors.  The 
Uniform Act’s legislative history is silent as to how preemption of state securities fraud 
laws might affect retail investors, or, indeed, institutional investors.  Instead, consistent 
with the Uniform Act’s goal of making federal courts the exclusive venue for securities 
fraud class actions, the legislative history is focused on the costs of parallel state and 
federal litigation.122  The dissenting views of certain Senators do evidence a concern that 
“in too many cases, investors will be left without any effective remedies at all.”123   
However, these dissenting Senators did not draw any distinction between retail investors 
and institutional investors, nor did they recognize that institutional investors would be 
able to opt out of federal securities class actions to avoid both the Reform Act and the 
Uniform Act, leaving retail investors the truly disadvantaged class of defrauded investors. 
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A possible exception to Congressional apparent indifference towards defrauded 
investors is the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.124  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
was a legislative response to the notorious accounting and securities fraud scandals 
typified by Enron and WorldCom, in which defrauded investors suffered billions of 
dollars in losses.  Following these scandals, commentators wondered whether Congress 
was responsible in part for these massive frauds, pointing out that the Reform Act had 
significantly undermined the ability of the securities fraud class action to deter fraud.125  
With these criticisms, and the then-existing political environment, it is not at all 
surprising that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s legislative history evidences more of a concern 
for defrauded investors.  However, Congress did not choose to ease the burdens placed on 
plaintiffs bringing securities fraud class actions.126  Instead, Congress chose a different 
approach, enacting laws designed to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial 
statements and other corporate disclosures, which Congress hoped would lead to 
increased investor protection.127  But, once again, the legislative history of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act contains no specific reference to retail investors.   
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 For a good discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Lawrence Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 917 (2003). 
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Securities fraud class actions have been disfavored by most federal courts for a 
long time,128 but that does not necessarily mean that courts have purposely disfavored 
retail investors, as compared to institutional investors.  After all, institutional investors 
will be members of the class action as well, and will probably be the most numerous 
members of the class and will have suffered the greatest losses.  But, like Congress, 
courts do not generally recognize a retail investor as being any different from any other 
kind of investor.   
The SEC has recognized that not all investors are alike, and that the federal 
securities laws may need to treat retail investors differently.129  Sometimes, the differing 
treatment can be seen in the SEC’s disclosure rules, such as the “Plain English” 
initiative130 or Regulation FD.131  At other times, the differing treatment can be seen in 
exemptions from the registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933, such as 
Regulation D.132   
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 36 
The SEC has also recognized that retail investors are particularly vulnerable to 
securities fraud and thus may need special protections.  For example, the SEC has created 
an “Office of Investor Education and Assistance,” which, according to the SEC’s website 
“provide[s] a variety of services to address the problems and questions you may face as 
an investor.”133  A review of the information contained on the OIEA site demonstrates 
that the OIEA is attempting to meet the specialized needs of retail investors,134 especially 
as to securities fraud.135  In addition to investor education, the SEC has attempted to 
protect retail investors from securities fraud by instituting an aggressive enforcement 
policy that focuses on specific types of securities fraud targeted at especially vulnerable 
retail investors.136  However, the SEC has not evidenced the same kind of concern for 
retail investors, or, indeed, for any investors, who seek a private remedy for securities 
fraud.137 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regulation D offering.  In these ways, the SEC provides increased protections under the federal securities 
laws to the typical retail investor.   
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Most legal scholars have not given much attention to the plight of the retail 
investor who has been defrauded by false corporate disclosures.138  Aside from some 
recent work that considers how the “reasonable investor” materiality standard may 
disadvantage retail investors,139 there is very little scholarship addressing retail investors 
and the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.140  In fact, there is very little 
legal scholarship addressing retail investors at all.141  I suppose that this disinterest should 
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Offerings Conducted Over the Internet:  Are They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
67 (1998); Felix Salmon, Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837 (2004).  The 
remaining articles address a wide variety of issues relating to retail investors.  See Howell E. Jackson, To 
What Extent Should Individual Investors Rely on the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency:  A Preliminary 
Investigation of Dispersion in Investor Returns, 28 J. CORP. L. 671 (2003); Eric C. Otness, Comment, 
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not be surprising, as most of the “action” in federal securities regulation focuses on 
institutional investors.  
IV. What Should Be Done To Address the Disfavored Treatment of Retail 
Investors under Rule 10b-5? 
Even if retail investors are not purposefully disfavored by the antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws, the fact remains that they are disfavored.  What, if 
anything, should be done to address their disadvantaged position under Rule 10b-5? 
1.  Do Nothing.   
An argument could be made that nothing should be done to address the disfavored 
treatment of retail investors under Rule 10b-5.  After all, the typical defrauded retail 
investor ordinarily suffers a relatively small amount of damages.  If  this disfavored 
treatment costs a retail investor only $100 or so, why get upset?  Moreover, as Professor 
Richard Booth has argued, investors can largely protect themselves from false corporate 
disclosures through diversification.142  Thus, if retail investors choose to ignore the 
benefits of diversification, they should not be able to recover under Rule 10b-5.   
These may be valid points, but before policymakers decide to ignore the 
disfavored treatment of retail investors, they should consider several additional concerns.  
Disfavored treatment could lead retail investors to question the fairness of the federal 
securities laws, contributing to a loss of investor confidence in U.S. markets.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Today’s Fragmented Equity Markets, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1607 (2002); S. Eric Wang, Investing Abroad:  
Regulation S and U.S. Retail Investment in Foreign Securities, 10 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 329 (2002).  In 
addition to these articles which expressly focus on retail investors, a few articles address issues affecting 
retail investors through discussions of investor sophistication.  See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not 
Issuers:  A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000) (proposing that investors be licensed in 
order to participate in the securities markets); Fletcher, supra note 58, at 1085 (proposing that “ a court may 
properly treat sophisticated investors differently from other investors when the claim at issue involves 
either explicit congressional permission or a judicially created right of action”). 
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 Richard A. Booth, The End of Securities Fraud Class Action?, 29 REG. 46 (2006). 
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Specifically, if retail investors become aware of the two-tiered system of investor 
remedies, they might think twice about investing in the stock market.  This is not merely 
an academic concern.  In other areas of securities regulation, policymakers have long 
recognized that a perception that the securities markets do not provide a “level playing 
field” for all investors creates the danger of a loss of investor confidence.143  While it is 
impossible to determine whether the disfavored treatment described above would cause 
retail investors to abandon the stock market, it is a legitimate concern.144  
 Another concern is that disfavored treatment under the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws would encourage retail investors to shift from direct investments to 
indirect investments.  In other words, retail investors would shift money that had been 
directly invested in stocks into mutual funds.  These former retail investors would then 
gain the benefits of the privileged status awarded to institutional investors by antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws.  Of course, this would lead to an even higher 
level of institutionalization of stock ownership.  Not only would retail investors come out 
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ahead under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, they would also 
presumably gain the benefits of diversification. 
However, such reallocation from direct stock ownership to indirect ownership 
could harm the securities markets.  It is widely recognized that retail investors provide 
needed liquidity to U.S. stock markets.145  If a market is comprised only of institutional 
investors, there will be relatively few potential buyers and sellers.  Thus, institutional 
investors wanting to sell their presumably large holdings might be unable to find 
buyers.146  Similarly, institutional investors wanting to purchase stock in companies may 
not be able to find a seller.  Such an imbalance would undermine the efficiency of the 
stock markets. 
2. Address Specific Areas of Disfavored Treatment of Retail Investors. 
A second approach would be to attempt to correct one or more of the three 
specific areas of disfavored treatment identified above:  (1) that retail investors who are 
members of a securities fraud class action are disfavored by the rebuttable presumption 
contained in the lead plaintiff provision and by the “reasonable investor” materiality 
standard; (2) that retail investors – as holders of securities -- often do not have any 
remedies for securities fraud; and (3) that the Reform Act and the Uniform Act have 
created a two-tiered system of remedies for securities fraud.  Although this approach 
might succeed as to one or two identified areas of disfavored treatment, I am not 
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optimistic that it will improve the overall treatment of retail investors under the federal 
securities laws.   
First, the good news.   The rebuttable presumption in the lead plaintiff provision is 
the one example where retail investors are expressly disfavored under the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws.  But this is not necessarily a bad thing.  As 
discussed above,147 there may very well be good reasons for preferring institutional 
investors over retail investors as lead plaintiffs.  Still, concerns remain that large 
institutional investors may have very different objectives than small retail investors, 
creating the danger that institutional investors might be willing to compromise the 
interests of retail investors.  However, if courts are receptive to arguments by retail 
investors that the presumption ought to be rebutted because the institutional investor 
would not adequately represent the class, then the concern that the lead plaintiff provision 
treats retail investors unfairly is reduced.  Some courts have shown a willingness to 
appoint co-lead plaintiffs to ensure that retail investors are fairly represented in the class 
action.  More courts need to follow this lead. 
There is some hope that courts are becoming more sensitive to the danger that the 
“reasonable investor” materiality standard can negatively impact retail investors.  As 
discussed above,148 a few courts seem to have misapplied the TSC Industries standard, 
perhaps deliberately, to permit securities fraud claims to go forward, even though the 
misleading statements pretty clearly constituted puffery and were therefore immaterial as 
a matter of law.  However, I doubt that this more liberal approach to the materiality 
standard will become widely accepted by courts.  First, the judicial misapplication of the 
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materiality standard seems to have arisen primarily in SEC enforcement actions, not 
private class actions.  In an enforcement action, a court may be willing to bend the 
materiality standard to ensure that the SEC is able to stop cases of egregious fraud.  
Enforcement actions, after all, are considered meritorious.  But securities fraud class 
actions are another matter altogether.  Securities fraud class actions are generally viewed 
by courts as frivolous, non-meritorious, and vexatious.  I doubt that courts would bend 
the materiality standard to permit a securities fraud class action to survive a motion to 
dismiss.149  Nor do I advocate courts purposefully misapplying the law in order to 
achieve a more “just” result.  Such an approach would simply inject confusion into our 
understanding of the materiality standard.  Instead, in determining whether a statement 
constitutes puffery in a securities fraud class action, courts should carefully consider the 
context of the disclosure,150 as well as the teachings of behavioral finance,151 before 
dismissing the claim as a matter of law.   
Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that the federal securities laws will be amended 
to permit investors who have been defrauded into holding securities to recover under the 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  The potential unfairness of the 
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purchaser-seller holding requirement has been recognized since Blue Chip Stamps was 
decided more than 30 years ago.152  And only last year, the Supreme Court again 
foreclosed holders from recovering, this time under state law.153  Securities fraud class 
actions are viewed with suspicion by the courts, by Congress, and by the SEC.  
Academics are torn as to whether private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 provides a benefit, 
with some even advocating that the securities fraud class action should be eliminated.154  
In this kind of environment, it is doubtful that pointing out that the standing requirement 
effectively makes Rule 10b-5 irrelevant to most retail investors would persuade policy 
makers to change the law.  This is one type of disfavored treatment that will not be 
remedied. 
Finally, what should be done about the two-tiered system of investor remedies for 
securities fraud, which provides institutional investors with a choice of law and forum?  
Although I believe that this disparate treatment between retail investors and institutional 
investors is troubling, I am not in favor of amending the securities laws to preclude 
institutional investors from “opting out” of federal securities fraud class actions to take 
advantage of more attractive state laws and forums.  While the opportunity to pick and 
choose securities fraud remedies offers institutional investors a significant advantage over 
retail investors, the solution is not to take that opportunity away from institutional 
investors.  That would only make it more difficult for defrauded institutional investors to 
obtain damages for their losses.  To level the playing field, retail investors would have to 
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be given the same opportunity to seek redress in either forum, but that is obviously not 
going to happen.  After all, the Uniform Act was enacted for the very purpose of 
preventing defrauded investors from bringing class actions in state court. 
Moreover, to take this opportunity away from institutional investors, the Uniform 
Act would have to be amended to preempt all securities fraud actions, not just class 
actions.  Preempting all securities fraud actions would be an extreme response and would 
raise significant federalism issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.  In Dabit, for 
example, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that holding claims were preempted by the 
Uniform Act was based in part on the fact that individual claims could still be brought 
under state law.155  Therefore, the Court reasoned, the presumption against preemption 
“carrie[d] less force.”156   
V. Conclusion. 
For most retail investors, Rule 10b-5 does not provide an adequate remedy for 
securities fraud.  Moreover, policymakers have been so focused on privileging 
institutional investors that they have simply overlooked retail investors, effectively 
creating a two-tiered system of investor remedies for securities fraud.   
This failure to consider retail investors as a discrete subgroup of investors has 
harmed retail investors, and has created the potential for serious unintended 
consequences.  Because Rule 10b-5 does not provide an effective remedy, retail investors 
will have no choice but to view false corporate disclosures as just another cost of 
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investing, not much different than brokerage fees.  If these costs get too high, retail 
investors may pull their money out of the stock market.  Or retail investors may respond 
to their disfavored status by moving their money into mutual funds.  Put another way, 
disfavored treatment under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws imposes 
a penalty on retail investors who choose to invest directly in the stock market.  
If policymakers wish to discourage the average investor from investing directly in 
the stock market, then they should do so expressly.  If this is not their intention, then 
policymakers need to become much more aware of the plight of the defrauded retail 
investor when considering reforms to private securities fraud litigation and in 
determining enforcement initiatives. 
 
